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Most analyses of the collective actions that led to the Iranian rev- 
olution rest upon one of two classical models: social breakdown 
or social movement .  These explanations emphasize such factors as 
the politicization of recently uprooted  migrants, the growth of a 
new middle class opposing autocracy, the authority of the clergy, 
and specific aspects of Shiite Islam. Conflicts of interest, capacity 
for mobilization, coalition formation, and the structure of oppor- 
tunities that shaped the collective actions of various groups and 
classes are ignored or downplayed. This paper  argues that mobi- 
lization and collective action against the monarchy resulted from 
the adverse effects of state development  policies on bazaaris, in- 
dustrial workers,  white-collar employees,  and professionals. Ba- 
zaaris' mobilization provided an opportunity for other social groups 
and classes to oppose the government.  A coalition of disparate in- 
terests, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, brought  down the monarchy." 
Iran's two major  twentieth-century revolu- 
tions, a n d  especially the second, appear so 
aberrant  They do no t  f i t  very closely wide- 
spread ideas o f  wha t  modern  revolut ions  
should  be like. Yet  there is no doub t  that  the 
I s lamic  revolut ion in 1 9 7 8 - 7 9  prov ided  a 
thoroughgoing overthrow o f  the o ld  political,  
social, and  ideological order (Keddie, 
1983:580). 
Although many observers have argued that Iran's most  recent  revolution 
departed somewhat  f rom previous patterns of revolutionary mobiliza- 
tion and outcome,  most  analysts have a t tempted to explain the collec- 
tive actions that led to the over throw of the monarchy by using one of 
two classical theoretical models: social breakdown and social move- 
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ment. Generally speaking, the social breakdown model emphasizes those 
processes that culminate in the dissolution of traditional social struc- 
tures, norms, and values. Large-scale social transformations such as in- 
dustrialization, commercialization, and urbanization are hypothesized to 
generate social disorganization and associated strains, frustrations, anx- 
ieties, disorientations, and grievances, which in turn may explode in 
collective violence and civil disorder (Johnson,  1966; Smelser, 1962, 
1966). One variation of this model  emphasizes social mobilization and 
the resultant rise of new needs and demands, which in turn may en- 
gender  political tension (Deutsch, 196i) .  Another  variation stresses the 
destabilizing effects of  rapid social and economic  change and the re- 
sultant disjunction be tween  political and economic  development ,  which 
may produce  disorder and violence (Huntington, 1968). In contrast, the 
social movemen t  model  follows Weber ' s  emphasis on ideational factors 
and authority figures. Social movements  are founded upon  "the con- 
scious volition, normative commi tmen t  to . . . aims or beliefs, and ac- 
tive participation on the part  of followers or members"  (Wilkinson, 
1971:27). According to this view, groups develop new collective deft- 
nitions of  the wor ld  and of themselves that elaborate new goals, norms 
of behavior, and justifications for the power  of  authorities. 
I intend to show that both  these models  are inst t~cient  to explain 
the collective actions that brought  down the Iranian monarchy. Any ex- 
planation of the revolutionary conflicts in Iran must  take into account  
variables emphasized by resource mobilization theory (Tilly, 1978): 
conflicts of interests, capacity for mobilization, opportunit ies for collec- 
tive action, and formation of coalitions. A full explanation must  also ana- 
lyze the structural vulnerabilities of  the Pahlavi state. In this article, I 
present  a critique of social b reakdown and social movemen t  analyses as 
they have been applied to the Iranian case. I then offer an alternative 
explanation of the mobilization and collective actions in the political 
conflicts that culminated in the Iranian revolution. 
THE SOCIAL BREAKDOWN MODEL 
The literature on the Iranian political conflicts is vast and contin- 
ues to grow. The following discussion will consider only those works  
that deal specifically wi th  the revolution and approximate  one of these 
two schools of  thought. The social b reakdown model,  in one form or 
another, has been  most  commonly  used to analyze the collective actions 
that over threw the Iranian monarchy. Majid Tehranian, for example,  has 
argued that modernizat ion entailed a triple curse for Iran. In the first 
place, modernization arrived in Iran in the form of Westernization, which 
meant  the "uprooting of indigenous social, economic,  political, educa- 
tional, and legal institutions in favor of  their Western counterparts.  The 
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cohesion and coherence  of a traditional corporate  society was thus 
gradually replaced by  the tensions and contradictions of  a modernizing 
society wi th  few, if any, indigenous modernizing institutions" (1980:6). 
Secondly, Westernization bred  a political and cultural elite whose hab- 
its, tastes, and life-style differed sharply f rom the rest  of the population, 
thereby creating deep social divisions. Finally, modernizat ion was ac- 
companied by economic  growth, which brought  with it rapid urbani- 
zation, social mobilization, and the unfolding of an acquisitive consumer  
society. "The social system was not able, however,  to absorb the dis- 
integrating effects of all these forces which were  unleashed, particularly 
after the so-called 'White Revolution' of the early 1960s. What  seemed 
to many foreign observers as a showcase of enlightened dictatorship and 
development  was in fact the making of a national tragedy" (1980:10). 
Another aspect of the breakdown model has been stressed by Jerrold 
Green (1980), who argued that "rapid socioeconomic development gave 
rise to demands for popular  participation" (1980:32). Because the Shah 
ignored these demands, he forced those who  sought participation to use 
means outside the existing system. According to Green, the Shah wanted 
to develop Iran economically, but  was unwilling to modernize the coun- 
try's political system. This contradiction lay at the root  of the revolution. 
The Shah's policies increased the rate of literacy, educational attain- 
ment,  urbanization, and exposure  to mass media. The resulting social 
mobilization led to the rapid proliferation of ideas and to politicization. 
As Green suggests, "such ideas are not necessarily dangerous, but  given 
the absence of  communicat ion be tween the Crown and the Iranian peo- 
ple, and the denial of  political participation, they ultimately proved  to 
be fatal" (1980:38-39) .  The ou tcome was societal instability and even- 
tual breakdown because the regime was unable or  unwilling to permit  
greater participation in the political sphere. 
More recently, Green has argued that the revolution derived from 
a combinat ion of additional crucial factors, the first of  which was the 
Shah's unwillingness to employ coercion to repress middle class profes- 
sionals who  demanded political liberalization (1986:129-130) .  Re- 
duced repression was contraI T to the Shah's historical policies and was 
due in part  to international pressures to liberalize, as well  as to the 
Shah's cancer  and the listlessness that resulted from his chemotherapy.  
It was also possible the Shah refrained f rom repression to facilitate his 
son's succession to the throne. A second factor contributing to the rev- 
olution was the polarization of the population against the regime. Thou- 
sands of mullahs linked through mosque networks politicized recent  ur- 
ban migrants in that direction. Finally, several specific repressive incidents 
in which hundreds of  people  were  killed by the regime enhanced peo- 
ple's unity in the struggle against the Shah. 
According to Amin Saikal (1980:203-204) ,  the Shah's dual objec- 
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tives of  strengthening the monarchy  and transforming Iran into a mod- 
e m  pro-Western state were  mutually incompatible and brought  about  
his downfall. To strengthen his position, the Shah a t tempted  to make 
himself indispensable by centralizing power  as much  as possible. In the 
1970s, he  embarked upon  a policy of  harsh political repression and ma- 
nipulation of economic  and social processes. However,  his program of 
socioeconomic development  unleashed forces contradictory to central- 
ized rule, including growing political and economic  decentralization, 
public participation, and individual initiative. In 1977, when  the Shah 
became aware of the dilemma, he initiated a policy of gradual "liber- 
alization" that p roved  too slow and too late, and as a consequence,  he 
was forced f rom the throne. 
Similarly, Nasser Momayezi (1986)  has argued that Iran's socio- 
economic  development  increased the rate of literacy, exposed a grow- 
ing number  of  people  to the mass media, and inevitably fostered the 
growth of a new middle class that eventually consti tuted more  than 25 
percent  of  the population. These developments  generated new aspira- 
tions for political participation. However,  "Iran's formal political struc- 
ture was not developing the requisite capacities to deal with the de- 
mand for political involvement. The resulting unevenness of development 
among socioeconomic and political sectors, and the degree and pat tern 
of imbalance, had consequences  for domest ic  instability in Iran" 
(1986:77).  The new middle class acquired skills and talents through the 
educational system and was eager for political influence. This group played 
the most  active part  during the revolution. 
Nikki Keddie (1983)  has applied theories developed by Davies 
(1962)  and Marx to the Iranian case. She maintains that Iran's prerevolu- 
tionary exper ience  of the 1970s fits neatly into Davies's J-curve, which  
predicted revolution when rapid economic growth is followed by a sharp 
downswing. Increased oil revenues boosted investments, elevated infla- 
tion, intensified shortages, swelled urban migration, and aggravated 
hardship and popular  discontent. To cool down the economy and curb 
inflation, the government  cut back on construction, which especially 
affected recent  urban migrants, and reduced  payments  to clergy. These 
groups joined with  intellectuals and a large educated class to provide 
"the backbone of a new mass politics." Applying the "Marxist formula," 
Keddie maintains that "revolution occurs whenever  the relations of pro- 
duction . . . have changed beyond the ability of the old forms of po- 
litical power  and state organization to subsume the new economic  or- 
der" (1983:588, 591). She identifies the main conflict as one be tween 
major classes and the autocracy. The modernizat ion process had created 
a sizable, well-educated stratum of bureaucrats  mad technocrats,  while 
many industrialists had sprung from the bazaar. Along with workers, who  
felt grievances over  the growing privileges of  foreigners, this relatively 
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privileged new middle class, the upper class, and the rich bazaaris (mer- 
chants, shopkeepers, and artisans) were  discontented. "Their economic 
futures were  often determined arbitrarily and irrationally by fiat from 
the top, while they were  denied all real participation in self-government 
and the political process. Both the success and the failures of modern- 
ization put  different classes, from the urban poor  to the new middle 
classes, at odds with the autocratic government"  (1983:592). This anal- 
ysis fits precisely into Huntington's model of political conflict. 
A number of analysts have invoked the theory of rising expecta- 
tions to explain the Iranian revolution. John D. Stempel has maintained 
that increased oil revenues led the government  to implement a rapid 
development  policy. Coupled with the Shah's constant claim that he was 
building "The Great Society," this policy encouraged Iranians to expect  
an improved quality of life. However, improved economic conditions 
did not reach most Iranians who instead "looked on with growing envy, 
improving their lifestyle only slightly. The shortfall between expectat ion 
and results produced the political reaction that began to spell trouble 
for the govermlaent" (Stempel, 1981:9). Gary Sick has argued that rev- 
olutions seem to occur  in societies "when general expectations of im- 
proved political, economic or social conditions are thwarted or inter- 
rupted" (1985:159). Despite a long period of economic growth in the 
decade following the White Revolution, Iran's political system failed to 
keep pace with economic development,  and most social groups were  
excluded from the political process. As long as the general growth ben- 
efited most of the population, the system functioned. However, by the 
mid-1970s, the boom faltered, and distortions emerged in every eco- 
nomic sector. Once "popular discontent began seething beneath the 
surface, Iranians had no outlet to express their grievances, which began 
to build to the point of explosion" (Sick, 1985:160). In the absence of 
political channels people turned to the mosque, which Sick correct ly 
identified as the only institution not totally dominated by the Shah. Sim- 
ilar analyses based on rising expectations have been made by Thomas 
Walton (1980)  and Daniel Pipes (1983).  
THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT MODEL 
A second line of explanation for the Iranian revolution follows the 
social movement  model. In contrast to breakdown theories, which iden- 
tify the erosion of traditional values and structures as the fundamental 
cause of the revolution, the social movement  model assigns primary im- 
portance to religious values and the authority of the clergy. Shahrough 
Akhavi (1980, 1983) has identified several central elements of Shiism: 
the principle of  clerical fatwa, or the power  to command followers to 
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take particular action; Shiite martyrdom, which emulated the martyrdom 
of Imam Husayn; and the desire to maintain the integrity of the Islamic 
community. Under the Shah, political corporatism and the regime's pol- 
icies of economic  development  caused many social groups, including 
tribal groups, poor  peasants, the peti te bourgeoisie, and the urban poor,  
to decline. Middle class defection away from the Shah during the eco- 
nomic crisis of the mid-1970s, Akhavi agrees with other  observers, was 
largely a reaction against a sudden reversal in the general prosperity 
brought by oil. Most importantly, the Shah's attack upon the social, eco- 
nomic, and educational position of the clergy undermined the integrity 
of the Islamic community and consequently earned clerical disapproval 
and opposition. This attack might have succeeded had the Shah not also 
appropriated the "cultural symbols which in the past had been so vital 
in inculcating among Iranians a sense of self, an explanation of the cos- 
mos and social reality" (Akhavi, 1980:203). Through fatwa, the Islamic 
clergy withheld legitimacy from the Shah and his rule. Symbols of mar- 
tyrdom expressed in passion plays during the revolution mobilized Shiites 
against the regime. In combination, these Shiite features generated the 
collective actions that eventually over threw the monarchy. 
Said Arjomand (1981, 1986) has presented an analysis that com- 
bines elements of both breakdown and social movement  models, but  
places greater emphasis upon the latter. He assigns only a minor role 
to class interest in the revolution (1986:400),  stressing instead ideology, 
tradition, and culture. According to Arjomand, the monarchy was vul- 
nerable because it was so highly focused and dependent  upon a single 
person. The process of mobilization can be understood in terms of rapid 
social change that led to dislocation, "normative disturbance," and dis- 
orientation (1986:383). A "fundamental disorientation and anomie more 
than superficial short-run fiaastration of material expectation" (1986:397) 
fueled the widespread desire for revolutionary change. To reintegrate 
themselves into the community, dislocated individuals and g roups - -  
specifically recent  migrants and the urban p o o r - - e m b r a c e d  an Islamic 
revival from the mid-1960s onward. The new middle class also em- 
braced this religious revival, impelled by the "alienating modern  world" 
to "consolidate their attachment to the Islamic tradition and . . . realth'm 
their collective cultural identity" (1981:312). At the same time, the Shah's 
regime systematically undermined the position of the clergy, who  even- 
tually spearheaded a "traditionalist revolution." In assuming the lead- 
ership of the revolution, the clergy benefited from the long-standing 
historical alliance between the bazaar and the mosque. The basis of this 
alliance was an "intense rejection of foreign and antireligious cultural 
influences on the part of mullahs and the merchants of the bazaar" 
(1986:397). Finally, Arjomand argues that specific features of Shiite Is- 
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lam such as the Shiite theodicy of suffering, the mar tyrdom of Imam 
Husayn, and Shiite millenarianism enabled the clergy to harness tradi- 
tional religious sentiments in the struggle against the regime. 
Although Theda Skocpol is not a social movemen t  theorist, her 
analysis of  the Iranian collective actions falls within this category. In 
discussing Iran (1982),  she departs from her earlier structural theory 
of revolution (1979).  In that previous work, she refuted a model  of 
revolution based on ideological causation, but  the Iranian case, she now 
argues, was unique and did follow a model  of purposive action. More 
specifically, she elaborates on the possible role of  ideas and culture in 
shaping political action (1982:268).  The Iranian monarchy, like ancient 
regimes in France, Russia, and China, was fundamentally weak because 
the Shah did not rule in alliance with an independent  social class. In 
addition, his program of crash industrialization and military moderni-  
zation exper ienced setbacks as a result of fluctuations in the world  mar- 
ket, generating universal resentment  against him. Despite urban discon- 
tent, the Shah, according to Skocpol, should have been able to retain 
power  due to the munificent wealth and ominous repressive power  at 
his disposal. Ultimately, the force behind the Shah's downfall lay in "tra- 
ditional centers of urban communal  life and in networks of Islamic com- 
munication and leadership" (1982:271), that is, in bazaars and mosques. 
In Skocpol's view, the clergy were  the leaders of the bazaar, which con- 
nected  artisans and merchants  to agricultural producers.  By the mid- 
1970s, "the Shah seemed determined to attack the traditional aspects 
of bazaar life" (1982:272)  by controlling self-regulating merchants '  
councils, extending state involvement in trade, and launching an "anti- 
corruption" campaign against alleged profiteering in the bazaar. These 
activities coincided with the Shah's steady efforts to exclude the Islamic 
clergy from educational, legal, and welfare activities. The clergy, who, 
trained to interpret  Islamic law for believers, could claim, "as well or  
bet ter  than the monarchs,  to represent  authentically the will of  the Hid- 
den Imam" (1982:273), provided leadership, networks, and symbols of 
communicat ion against the Shah during the revolution. Even more  im- 
portant  in sustaining the struggles, Skocpol argues, was the Shiite belief 
system. In particular, the story of Husayn's willing mar tyrdom in the 
just cause of resisting the usurper  caliph, Yazid, inspired devout  Shiites 
to continue their opposit ion against the Shah in the face of repression 
and death. 
C R I T I Q U E  
These scholars have enhanced our understanding of the Iranian 
revolution by" exploring various reasons for the rise of opposit ion to the 
Shah during 1977-1979.  Although these analysts have correct ly  pointed 
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out many shortcomings of the Pahlavi regime, their theoretical expla- 
nations are unsatisfactory. In the following discussion, I shall offer both 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to illuminate some of the 
problems in these explanations. Because the works revieweed above all 
attempt to explain popular mobilization and collective actions, I will 
confine most of my analysis to those processes. 
Breakdown Theories  
Breakdown theories maintain that large-scale social transforma- 
tions such as urbanization are associated with rising collective action. 
Such transformations uproot  great numbers of individuals who experi- 
ence anomie and are likely to engage in antisocial acts. However, al- 
though large-scale transformations may indeed generate anxiety, frus- 
tration, and disorientation, they- do not automatically lead to collective 
action or culminate in social revolutions. In the first place, rising stress 
and strain do not necessarily generate the solidarity structures and re- 
sources required for collective action. Hence, although uprooted pop- 
ulations may have many grievances, they are unlikely to possess suffi- 
cient solidarity structures and networks to act collectively. The very 
experience of being uprooted is likely to reduce their capacity for col- 
lective action by dissolving existing solidarity structures (Tilly, Tilly, 
and Tilly, 1975). Second, even if uprooted populations were to engage 
in collective action, they would be more likely to attack other social 
groups such as landlords or merchants through rent strikes or food riots, 
rather than the state. After all, why should uprooted and anomic indi- 
viduals suddenly become politicized and attack the government, which 
possesses great resources to repress the unruly? The mere fact of recent 
migration to urban areas is insufficient to mobilize migrants to act col- 
lectively against the state. 
Empirical data on the participation of recent migrants in the an- 
tigovernment protests is extremely difficult to obtain. The sparse evi- 
dence that is available does not support the breakdown model. A con- 
flict between the government and recent migrants erupted in the summer 
of 1977 when the regime began demolishing shantytowns around Teh- 
ran. Although established, urbanized groups residing in these areas were 
able to mobilize and act collectively on some occasions, recent migrants 
living in shantytowns tended to abstain from collective action, prefer- 
ring to obtain housing permits from the government and thus solve their 
problems individually. This course of action was consistent with mi- 
grants' general view of authority and of the Shah. lake nineteenth-cen- 
tury Russian peasants, Iranian peasant migrants evidently believed that 
the Shah was simply unaware of their suffering at the hands of govern- 
ment officials. Had he known of their plight, he would doubtless have 
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acted on their behalf. Some simply expressed their hope  that it was time 
for God to act or avenge them against their oppressors (Organization, 
1978:4-5).  
During the later revolutionary uprising, many squatters still ap- 
parently did not act collectively against the regime. As late as December  
4, 1978, one squatter told a N e w  York Times reporte~ that he was obliged 
to work  from 6:00 A.M. to 7:00 P.M. and had no t ime to demonstrate,  
but he knew that "things will get bet ter  once the king goes." On January 
14, 1979, less than a month  before the monarchy fell, the Washington 
Post quoted another squatter as saying, "The demonstrations are all crap. 
No one has done anything for us except  when  we  s topped a car heading 
elsewhere that was distributing clothes in Khomeini 's  name. We have 
heard about the demonstrations, but  we  don' t  take part; to demonstrate  
you have to have a full stomach." The man added, "Whoever  gives us 
bread and work, we  will be  with him." 
In the more  formal industrial sector, recent  migrants appear to 
have been the least inclined to join strikes. For example,  recent  migrants 
employed at Isfahan Steel lacked the politicization of urbanized workers  
and partly caused the failure of  the steelworkers '  strike in the fall of  
1978 (Zob-e Ahan, 1 1978:16-17).  Their politicization was inhibited by 
the fact that some migrants worked  only part-t ime in the city because 
they had agrarian income in addition. They also had the opt ion of re- 
turning to their villages ff urban employment  p roved  unsatisfactot T. In 
sum, one cannot  conclude that migrants were  crucial in initiating the 
conflicts or were  essential to the over throw of the regime. During the 
final weeks of the revolution, some urban migrants, like a segment  of  
the peasantry, perhaps became politicized and joined ant igovernment  
demonstrations. But the available evidence does not  support  the asser- 
tion that recent  migrants were  highly politicized and especially active 
in ant igovernment protests throughout  the political conflicts. 
Another version of the breakdown theory emphasizes the disjunc- 
tion be tween  socioeconomic and political development.  According to 
this perspective,  the Shah's development  policies generated a new mid- 
dle class that demanded political f reedom and democracy.  Some break- 
down theorists point  to the National Front, the Lawyers' Association, 
and the Writers '  Association as examples of  middle-class organizations 
that began demanding political f reedom in the summer  of 1977. This 
theory fails, however,  to account  for the emergence  of vigorous political 
Zob.e Ahar~. Tahlily Bar Eatesab-e Mehr Mahe 1357 is a pamphlet presenting an analysis 
of the steel mill strike of October 1978, written by a group of steel employees. In this 
article, citations for pamphlets, newsletters, and newspapers include the date of the issue 
and page numbers ff available; no further bibliographical references are given for these 
sources. 
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conflicts in Iran in the absence of a sizable new middle class during the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1909,  or during the 1940s and the 
1950s. Without doubt, the new middle class expanded during Iran's rapid 
economic  development  of  the 1960s and 1970s. It should be  noted, 
though, that the leading figures in reformist organizations had been po- 
liticaUy active since the 1950s and 1960s and were not part of the newly 
expanding middle class. Even if we  assume that these organizations rep- 
resented the new middle class, this class did not respond to at tempts 
these organizations made to mount  opposit ion against the government.  
This class had little capacity for political action, lacking the requisite 
solidarity structures and organizations to act collectively. White-collar 
employees and professionals refrained from entering the conflict for more 
than a year after reformist political organizations had initiated opposi- 
tion activities. When they finally joined the conflicts, most  initially de- 
manded economic  rather than political changes. In short, the new mid- 
dle class cannot  be  said to have instigated collective action against the 
state; rather, they joined in struggles that had been  launched by others. 
Theoretical  explanations that invoke rising expectat ions or  Davies's 
J-curve argue that when oil revenues suddenly dropped, satisfaction, which 
had risen along with expectat ions as Iran's economic  condition im- 
proved, rapidly diminished, leading to collective action and revolution. 
These theories ignore several important  components  of  collective ac- 
tion, including the differential effects of economic  development,  the ca- 
pacity of actors, and the targets of  action. First, although higher oil rev- 
enues undoubtedly improved the satisfaction of some social groups, that 
exper ience  cannot  be generalized to the country  as a whole. In highly 
stratified societies, economic  improvements  are unlikely to benefit  all 
social classes or  to benefit  them equally. Although land reform raised 
peasants '  expectat ions and temporari ly improved conditions for some 
of them, the economic  growth of the 1970s adversely affected the in- 
come and expectat ions of the vast majority of  the rural population. In 
the urban areas, although Iranian industrialists accumulated huge sums 
of capital, most  industrial workers  were  adversely affected by higher oil 
revenues, which boosted inflation. Second, in order for groups to re- 
spond with collective action when  their established rights and interests 
are violated, they must  possess sufficient solidarity structures and re- 
sources. The J-curve and the theory of rising expectat ions assume the 
existence of both  solidarity and organization, a dubious assumption, and 
hence  are inadequate to explain mobilization and collective action. De- 
spite the deterioration of agricultural conditions, the peasantry took lit- 
tle part  in the collective actions of  revolutionary conflicts. Not  until the 
final days of  the revolution did a segment  of the peasanty join in the 
ant igovernment  protests, and their actions were  inconsequential. Simi- 
larly, industrial workers  lacked the capacity and organization to mobi- 
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lize and initiate collective action to obtain a greater share of the in- 
creased national resources. "l]ms they did not engage in any collective 
action in the early stage of the conflicts, despite declining satisfaction, 
or "frustration" of their "expectations." In contrast, bazaaris did act col- 
lectively from the early period, partly because they possessed greater 
solidarity structures and resources. 
Nor, finally, do these theories specify the target of  collective ac- 
tion. Reduced satisfaction does not necessarily lead to an assault on the 
state. A natural disaster, for example,  might drastically reduce human 
satisfaction but  may not generate collective action, let alone a challenge 
to the state. Even when  reduced satisfaction is attributed to social causes, 
adversely affected groups may- turn upon a class or  group deemed  re- 
sponsible. In such cases the dominant  class or a minori ty group, rather  
than the state, may become  the target of attack. During the 1930s, the 
Great Depression in the United States did not prompt  an offensive against 
the state. Instead, industrial workers  acted against their employers  to 
gain certain rights, including the recognit ion of labor unions for collec- 
tive bargaining (Parsa, 1985). In contrast, Iranian bazaaris acted against 
the state, which they identified as the source of conflict and injustice. 
Had the Iranian economic  decline been  perpet ra ted  by the market  
mechanism, bazaaris might have ended up blaming themselves, as did 
some American businessmen during the depression. For all these rea- 
sons, the J-curve and the theory of rising expectat ions provide at best  
only a partial explanation of the Iranian revolution. 
Socia l  M o v e m e n t  T h e o r i e s  
Unlike social breakdown theories, social movemen t  theories of the 
Iranian revolution focus primarily on the importance of specific Shiite 
beliefs and the clergy's legitimate authority in mobilizing the Iranian 
people. The Shiite culture of mar tyrdom and the desire to maintain the 
integrity of  the Islamic community,  combined  with clerical authority 
and the power  to issue fatwa, have been  advanced as pr imary factors 
responsible for the over throw of the monarchy. These explanations tend 
to be  circular accounts that begin with the ou tcome of the revolution, 
that is, clerical victory or the establishment of  the Islamic Republic, and 
work  backward to rationalize it. Such analyses obscure the process  that 
led to those outcomes.  
Perhaps cultural and religious symbols play a role in political mo- 
bilization. Their part  must  be  considered within the larger social and 
economic  framework, however.  In 1963, when  most  clergy opposed the 
government  reforms as anti-Islamic, the authority of the clergy and ap- 
peals to Shiite mar tyrdom were  insufficient to mobilize the vast majority 
of Iranians. Protests of segments of the population in a few major cities 
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lasted only for three days, after which time government repression brought 
them to an end. I t  is not  the case, as Skocpol thinks, that urban Iranians 
consti tuted traditional communit ies  that always followed their religious 
leaders or that Iranians wanted to maintain the integrity of their Islamic 
communities.  The fact that they ultimately formed a coalition against 
the monarchy does not prove  that they were  composed  of such com- 
munities. Indeed Iranian society had been divided along class lines long 
before the 1979 revolution. Even bazaaris did not  form communities,  
because, as I will show, they were  economically and politically diverse. 
More importantly, the different groups and classes that opposed the gov- 
e rnment  had different resources and solidarities, as well  as conflicts and 
grievances, and therefore entered into active opposition at different times 
(Abrahamian, 1982; Ashraf and Banuazizi, 1985). Finally, clerical rule 
has not  resolved many of the prerevolut ionary conflicts; massive con- 
flicts and violence have continued after the revolution (Parsa, 1986). 
Analyses based on Shiite mar tyrdom or analyses that depict  Iranian so- 
ciety as composed  of  traditional communit ies  cannot  explain these post- 
revolutionary conflicts. 
Social movemen t  analysts also stress the significance of clerical au- 
thority. They tend to por t ray the clergy as a homogenous  social stratum, 
pursuing a united politics. In fact, the clergy were  far from unified 
throughout  the 1970s. Religious authorities represented a spec t rum of 
political views: some supported the monarchy, others opposed it, while 
the vast majority were  nonpolitical. The preeminent  clerics residing in 
Iran were  among the nonpolitical camp. For example,  the highest reli- 
gious leader in Tehran, Ayatollah Khonsari, asked bazaaris not  to close 
down when  they were  preparing for a strike to protest  the government  
massacre of  clerical students in Qom in January 1978 (Freedom Move- 
ment,  Vol. I:127). In response to this massacre, p reeminent  clerics met  
but  failed to p roduce  a joint s tatement and made no recommendat ion  
to the Q o m  bazaar already on strike. One of them argued that the ba- 
zaars should reopen, angering the bazaaris (Freedom Movement,  Vol. 
I:52). More importantly, the religious leaders rejected a popular  request  
for a nationwide strike (Payam-e Mujahed, z #53) .  As protests  spread, 
these clerics chose a relatively modera te  approach, asking that the con- 
stitution be implemented as written and not abolished. They never called 
for the establishment of an Islamic Republic. They consistently dis- 
couraged radical confrontation and never  exhor ted  their followers to 
become  martyrs (Zamimeh-e  Khabar Nameh, 1978, #16:3) .  In fact, in 
mid-August 1978, they avoided requesting mourning ceremonies  ex- 
2 Payam-e Mujahed was a weekly publication of an Islamic group in the United States. 
Zamimeh-e Khabar Nameh, also cited in this paragraph, is a compilation of newsletters 
published by the National Front in 1977 and 1978. 
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pressly because previous mourning observances had led to additional 
deaths. 
Divisions also existed within the clerical minority who were  po- 
litical. Although a small fraction 3 had long supported the Shah even dur- 
ing the 1963 conflicts (Akhavi, 1980), most opposed the Shah. Many 
followed Ayatollah Khomeini's line and were  consistently repressed by 
the regime. For years, this segment of the clergy lacked the capacity to 
mobilize the population, partly because many well-known clerical ac- 
tivists had been jailed. Furthermore, pro-Khomeini clerics were  mostly 
concentrated in a few religious centers and large cities, rather than dis- 
tributed evenly throughout the country. Fully one-quarter of all clerical 
arrests took place in the religious center  of Qom, while an additional 
45 percent  occurred in seven other  cities. 4 Despite uneven distribution, 
this faction of the clergy was able to attain a central position in the 
revolutionary conflict due to a combination of bazaari conflicts and the 
dynamics of state policies. Bazaari mobilization against the government  
provided an opportunity for these clerics to oppose the regime. With 
the reforms introduced in the fall of 1978, this faction's capacity to act 
was enhanced by the cessation of  clerical arrests and the release of  vir- 
tuaUy all jailed clerics. 
It is important to recognize that bazaari conflicts and mobilization 
did not  grow out of a clash between religious traditionalism and mod- 
ernization. Although most bazaaris have indeed been religious and some 
paid religious taxes, their mobilization and collective actions have not 
always followed clerical leadership. Rather, their conflicts can bet ter  be 
explained by a combination of  their economic interest, their capacity 
to organize for collective action, and their opportunity for mobilization, 
as a brief review of clerical and bazaari politics will illustrate. 
COLLECTIVE A C T I O N  AND CONFLICTS 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 7 5  
In the early 1950s, intense political conflicts, in which all major 
social groups and classes took sides, broke out between royalists and 
nationalist supporters of prime minister Dr. Mosaddegh. During these 
3 Approximately one hundred of these clerics were  defrocked following the revolution; 
some of them were imprisoned, others exiled, and a few were executed. Authorities stated 
that the remainder have promised not to oppose the Islamic Republic (Kayban, 1981: May 
27). 
4 Data on arrests of opposition clerics during the first nine months of their protests in- 
dicate that roughly 25 percent came from Qom, 13 percent from Tehran, 7 percent each 
from Mashhad and Hamedan, 5 percent each from Isfahan and Semnan, 4 percent from 
Shiraz, 4 percent from Rezaieh, and the rest from other cities. Arrests do not provide a 
complete indication of the distribution of radical clergy for many doubtless avoided ar- 
rest by moving underground. Living clandestinely, however, would have limited their ef- 
fectiveness in mobilizing the opposition. 
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conflicts, the politics and collective actions of bazaaris sharply diverged 
from those of most clergy. The conservative clergy, led by- the country's 
preeminent cleric Ayatollah Boroujerdi, threw their support behind the 
Shah, arguing that Mosaddegh would lead the nation to communism. 
When oil was nationalized, these clerics and royalist members of the 
Majlis, or parliament, demonstrated in the Qom seminary, rejecting na- 
tionalization as a violation of property and as contrary to the laws of 
Islam (Nategh, 1982). In July 1952, during the conflict between Mo- 
saddegh and the Shah over control of the army, the preeminent clerics 
of Qom sent their representative to Tehran to express support for the 
Shah (Nategh, 1982). When the monarch fled the country on August 
16, 1953, Boroujerdi sent him a telegram asking him to return to pre- 
serve the nation, Islam, and the country's security. He and other high- 
ranking clerics in Qom held prayer sessions for the Shah's return (Ja- 
zani, 1979:139). 
During the economic and political crisis that followed the nation- 
alization of oil, most politically active clerics who had supported Mo- 
saddegh left the nationalist camp and instead forged an alliance with the 
royalists. Among those who deserted the prime minister for the mon- 
archy was Ayatollah Kashani, influential speaker of the Majlis it] 1952 
and 1953. He attempted to obstruct the passage of Mosaddegh's poli- 
cies, charging that the prime minister had worsened economic condi- 
tions, violated the constitution, and was ruling the country in a dicta- 
torial fashion. When Mosaddegh requested an extension of his emergency 
powers to resolve the country's crisis, Kashani refused to go along. Ka- 
shani refused to convene the Majlis to pass the report of the Eight-Mem- 
ber Committee designed to curb the monarch's power. Kashani opposed 
Mosaddegh's attempt to dissolve parliament by a popular referendum, 
labeling it illegal and dictatorial. Two days before the voting, Kashani 
led the right-wing opposition in a call to boycott the referendum (Et- 
telaat, 5 1953: August 1). Ayatollah Behbahani also consistently opposed 
Mosaddegh and supported the royalist position. During the coup d'6tat 
that removed the prime minister, Ayatollah Behbahani organized hoo- 
ligans who, along with the army, looted National Front headquarters, 
the homes of the prime minister's supporters, and even the house of 
Mosaddegh himself. 
when the majority of the clergy broke away from Mosaddegh, most 
bazaaris, organized in an independent guild called the Society of Tehran 
Bazaar Merchants, Shopkeepers, and Artisans (STBMSA), continued to 
support the prime minister. The bazaaris' economic position had been 
adversely affected by the large stock of imported goods after World ~rar 
II and the economic recession that lasted from 1947 until 1952, which 
Ette laat  is an I ranian  nat ional  newspape r .  
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caused bankruptcies among merchants and small producers. Bazaaris 
blamed their plight on royalist policies and therefore supported Mosad- 
degh's nationalist government  and demonstrated their support  on cru- 
cial occasions. When Mosaddegh's government lacked sufficient reve- 
nue to pay government  employees, merchants and shopkeepers lined 
up to buy special government  bonds issued to ease the financial crisis. 
On July 17, 1952, when the prime minister resigned to protest the Shah's 
control over the army, Tehran bazaaris immediately struck and took to 
the streets in anti-Shah protests. Bazaaris elsewhere soon foUowed suit, 
closing their shops and holding sit-ins. On July 21, bazaaris across the 
country demonstrated in response to a call by the National Front to 
support the prime minister, thus forcing the Shah to reinstate him. On 
that day eight hundred people were  killed or injured in Tehran by the 
army. When Ayatollah Kashani and other clerics broke with Mosad- 
degh's National Front, the STBMSA continued to back the prime min- 
ister. They condemned Mosaddegh's opponents and demanded approval 
of the Eight-Member Committee's recommendat ion to curb the power  
of the Shah (Ettelaat,  1953: April 14). On this occasion, bazaaris dem- 
onstrated in overwhelming numbers in support of Mosaddegh (New York 
Times, 1953: April 16). On the first anniversary of the July 21 massacre, 
bazaaris throughout the country again closed down to attend pro-Mo- 
saddegh rallies (Ettclaat, 1953: July 23). Even in the religious center of 
Qom, shopkeepers struck in support  of Mosaddegh (Ettelaat, 1953: July 
14). When Mosaddegh called for the referendum to dismiss parliament, 
bazaaris shut down their businesses to indicate support  for him, despite 
a clerical boycot t  of  the referendum. Industrial workers, organized pri- 
marily by the Tudeh Party-, and white-collar employees also supported 
Mosaddegh during these conflicts. The referendum passed overwhelm- 
ingly, with 2,043,380 nationwide voting to dismiss parliament and only 
1,207 voting to retain it (Ettelaat, 1953: August 15), and the Shah was 
obliged to dissolve the Majlis and order new parliamentary elections. 
Following a failed coup d'6tat organized by the monarch against 
the prime minister, bazaaris rallied in large numbers to condemn the 
Shah, who fled the country. Wheal a second coup finally ousted Mosad- 
degh three days later, bazaaris struck in protest  (New York Times, 1953: 
August 21, 22). Despite assurances by the govermllent that they would 
not be arrested nor their shops attacked, bazaaris refused to reopen out 
of loyalty to the prime minister. Colonel Dadsetan, military governor of 
Tehran, publicly complained that merchants declined to resume busi- 
ness (Ettelaat, 1953: August 23). Finally, the government  forced them 
to reopen under duress (New York Times, 1953: August 25), and Gen- 
eral Zahedi threatened to destroy the roof  of the Tehran bazaar if the 
strikes were  repeated (Binder, 1962:295). 
A second round of political conflicts erupted in 1963 when  the 
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Shah introduced a series of reforms. The clergy led protests  during the 
Shiite mourning ceremonies.  Ayatollah Khomeini  was the most  outspo- 
ken opponent  of  the reforms, denouncing what  he  considered the re- 
gime's attacks on Islam and the clergy. Khomeini condemned  the ref- 
e rendum held by the Shah to approve his reforms as against the interests 
of the Iranian people. Khomeini was arrested on June 5, 1963, and within 
a few hours, protests  had broken out in Tehran, Qom, Mashhad, Isfahan, 
Shiraz, Tabriz, and Kashan. The bazaar in Tehran did not  close down 
immediately upon the spread of the news. When demonstrators  entered 
Tehran's central bazaar, however,  merchants  and shopkeepers  shut their 
shops and joined them. Once  shooting began, bazaaris retreated after 
suffering only a few casualties. In much  of the rest  of  the country, shop- 
keepers and merchants  refrained from ant igovernment  protests, in sharp 
contrast  to their active support  of  Prime Minister Mosaddegh a decade 
earlier. 
Bazaari opposit ion or lack of opposit ion to the government  can be 
explained in terms of a combinat ion of  their economic  interests, their 
lack of autonomous organization, and their opportuni ty  for action. Ba- 
zaaris had suppor ted  Mosaddegh's nationalistic economic  policies de- 
signed to halt growing international penetrat ion of Iranian markets. Fol- 
lowing the coup d'6tat, bazaari interests were  adversely affected by the 
Shah's economic  program, which encouraged foreign imports  and the 
deve lopment  of  modern  banking and industries. The economic  position 
of shopkeepers  and artisans was further undermined by two years of 
recession resulting f rom the imposition of a stabilization program rec- 
ommended  by the International Monetary Fund. Bankruptcies began to 
occur  throughout  the bazaars (Ettelaat, 1961: May 7), and bazaaris com- 
plained that the government  did nothing to p romote  commerce  (Ette- 
laat, 1963: May 21). Shopkeepers and artisans also protes ted a taxation 
scheme designed in 1961 by their guilds, objecting that guild leaders 
paid little taxes themselves and shifted the burden  to poorer  segments 
of the bazaar (Ettelaat, 1961: April 30). In protest,  bazaaris refused to 
pay taxes for more  than two years until the government  began an in- 
vestigation. In April 1963, investigators uncovered  300,000 cases of  re- 
fusal to pay taxes in Tehran alone, most  of which involved small shop- 
keepers  and artisans (Ettelaat, 1963: May 19). 
Although their economic  interests were  adversely affected by the 
government,  bazaaris lacked both leadership and cohesive organizations 
to mobilize for unified collective action. Since the Mosaddegh period 
when  they repeatedly issued statements and called for direct action, 
bazaaris had lost their capacity for mobilization. The pr imary reason for 
their inaction was repression. Bazaari leadership was weakened by the 
imprisonment  of  leaders of  the second National Front (Ettelaat, 1963: 
January 24) and by the banning of the independent  STBMSA. The new 
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Merchants' Guild, founded after the coup d'~tat, was controlled by the 
government. Shopkeepers in central bazaars of large cities participated 
in the demonstration of June 5, 1963, because their bazaars were  geo- 
graphically concentrated, providing networks and facilitating commu- 
nication. Clerical opposition to the regime provided an opportunity for 
these bazaaris to act collectively. Lack of organization, however, pre- 
vented many Tehran shopkeepers outside the central bazaar from taking 
part in the protests, and as a result, some stores were  smashed and even 
looted (Ettelaat, 1963: June 6; New York Times, 1963: June 9; Christian 
Science Monitor, 1963: June 6). Significantly, white-collar employees, 
professionals, and industrial workers, especially oil workers who  had 
played a crucial role during the nationalization strikes, as well as peas- 
ants, who welcomed the land offered by the government, did not  join 
the antigovernment demonstrations. 
On June 5, 1975, the twelfth anniversary of the 1963 uprising fol- 
lowing the arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini, another incident challenged 
the Shah's regime. More than a thousand tullab, or clerical students, 
took over the Madraseh Faizieh Qom, the most important educational 
establishment for clerics. The time and place were  obviously well cho- 
sen. The location was near the shrine of Fatima, a pilgrimage site for 
Shiite Moslems from all over the country. The protests were joined by 
clerical students from the Madraseh-e Khan, an adjacent school, and lasted 
for three consecutive days and nights. The rebels raised a red flag. sym- 
bol of Shiite martyrdom, high enough to be seen throughout  the city of 
Qom and began broadcasting tapes of Khomeini's tier), speeches against 
the Shah. When the uprising broke out, the government  shut off the 
school's water and electricity. Police surrounded the school and at- 
tempted to rout the students with tear gas and high-pressure water hoses, 
but  the protesters defended themselves with bricks and sticks. The re- 
bellion was finally put  down by several units of army commandos dis- 
patched from Tehran. By the second day, more  than five hundred stu- 
dents had been arrested, a few killed (Fischer, 1980), and many more 
injured. Following the insurrection's collapse, the Shah's secret police, 
the Savak, shut down the school, which remained closed throughout  the 
rest of the Shah's rule. 
Ayatollah Khomeini acted swiftly to endorse the students' cause. 
On the third day- of the insurrection, he sent a message of condolence 
on behaff of the martyrs of the Madraseh Faizieh Qom, congratulating 
them and the Iranian people for their struggle against the Shah's dic- 
tatorship and the United States's imperialism. He mentioned that forty- 
five had been killed and denounced the government 's  order  to refuse 
the injured admission to Qom hospitals. The general public offered no 
support for the rebellious students, however. No strikes or bazaar shut- 
downs occurred anywhere in the country. The closing of the most im- 
6O 
Theories of Collective Action 
po r t an t  clerical school in Qom precipi tated no response by any social 
class. No national day of mourning was called to commemorate  the deaths 
of  the mar tyred students, nor  was there any serious political condem- 
nation of the government ' s  actions except  by Khomeini. These signifi- 
cant events seem to have gone complete ly  unnot iced by the public. 
The lack of action by bazaaris can be  explained in terms of their 
economic  interests and the economic  prosperi ty  brought  about by the 
oil b o o m  of 1973. Although some segments of the bazaar, including 
blacksmiths, coppersmiths,  shoemakers, and moneylenders,  had been  
adversely affected by state economic development policies, the oil boom 
created a unique occasion for many bazaaris to increase their assets. The 
sudden increase in national investment  and consumpt ion boos ted  do- 
mestic trade. The bazaar still controlled more  than two-thirds of  the 
domestic trade and more than 30 percent of the nation's imports. Hence, 
bazaaris in various sectors were  in an advantageous position to benefit  
f rom the boom, and, as several bazaaris f rom Tehran and Tabriz have 
personally indicated to the author, a number  undoubtedly improved their 
economic  position. 
T H E  R E V O L U T I O N A R Y  P E R I O D ,  1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 9  
To understand the revolution of 1979, we  must  examine the na- 
ture of the state, its development  strategy, and the policies pursued by 
the government  be tween  1975 and 1977. We must  also investigate the 
capacities and resources for mobilization and collective action of  each 
group within the opposition. Our analysis will focus on the struggles of  
bazaaris, industrial workers,  white-collar employees,  and professionals, 
w h o  were  the crucial actors in the over th row of the monarchy. We will 
see that these groups and classes did not constitute homogeneous  "com- 
munities" but  instead were  characterized by disparate interests, re- 
sources, and capacities for collective action. 
State intervention in capital accumulat ion and economic  devel- 
opment  expanded following the 1963 reforms. Land reform undermined 
the power  of the landed upper  class and extended bureaucratic control  
over  the rural social order. State economic  centralization increased tre- 
mendously: the state soon owned oil, minerals, all modern  manufactur- 
ing enterprises, most  of  the banking, insurance, transport, and com- 
munication firms, and a sizable number  of  farms and agribusinesses. In 
contrast, the entire private sector accounted for less than 20 percent  
of the national income by the end of Pahlavi rule (Katouzian, 1980). 
Finally, as the state expanded its bureaucracy and industrial assets, it 
became the country 's  largest employer,  eventually employing approxi- 
mately one-third of the urban labor force. Such intervention rendered 
the state vulnerable to challenge and attack. The government  limited 
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and replaced abstract market forces and thereby directly confronted all 
major social classes. As a result, in times of economic crisis the state, 
rather than the market, can be blamed and attacked. 
Equally important was the nature of state development  policies 
that adversely affected major segments of the population. The state con- 
sistendy served the interests of the urban dominant class engaged in 
industry, banking, commerce,  and agriculture at the expense of the vast 
majority of the population. Government  development  strategy and the 
oil boom intensified existing inequalities and led to uneven develop- 
ment  (Pesaran, 1976; Halliday, 1978). State banking policies provided 
the small dominant class with cheap credit, while denying it to the mid- 
die and poor  segments of the population. Import-substitution with high 
tariffs favored the growth of monopolies in the industrial sector at the 
expense of consumers. Industrial development  was capital-intensive and 
restricted through limited licensing, thus preventing medium-sized cap- 
ital from entering the most profitable sector. The capital-intensive na- 
ture of development adversely affected the working class by utilizing 
primarily skilled labor, which created a labor aristocracy. The pool  of 
unskilled labor further expanded due to the government 's  neglect of 
agriculture and the consequent  peasant migration. As a result, stratifi- 
cation within the labor force increased. Government  taxation policies 
worsened the inequalities. The poorest  10 percent  of the population 
paid 11 percent  of their income in taxes, whereas the richest 10 percent  
paid only 8 percent  in taxes (Kayhan, 6 1978: October  23). Many of the 
wealthy did not even bother  to pay taxes. 
In 1976, the government 's oil revenues declined, forcing the re- 
gime to reduce expenditures, which resulted in economic recession. A 
major problem during this period was rising inflation, which the gov- 
ernment  attempted to check by controlling prices while lifting tariffs to 
increase imports. This price control  policy had far-reaching conse- 
quences, for it led to a direct confrontation with the bazaar, initiating 
intense conflicts that culminated in the overthrow of the monarchy. 
Bazaaris and  t h e  State 
After 1975, the vast majority of bazaaris experienced economic 
pressures. Small artisans and shopkeepers in the carpet sector, for ex- 
ample, were  adversely affected by inflation, which increased the price 
of raw materials and made Persian rugs less competitive on the world 
market. In addition, lack of tariff protect ion and growing importation of 
machine-made carpets reduced the domestic sale of rugs. Government  
prohibition of child labor increased labor costs. As a result, many ba- 
6 K a y h a n  is an  I ranian  na t iona l  newspaper ,  An in t e rna t iona l  edi t ion ,  c i t ed  later,  is a lso 
publ i shed .  
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zaaris in the rug business were  forced to change to other  sectors. In 
Ahvaz, capital of  the oil-rich province  of Khuzestan, thirty-six out of  
eighty shops selling Persian rugs closed down during the last nine months 
of  1977 (Kayhan, 1977: December  24). 
With the economic  crisis caused by declining oil revenues, the 
government  imposed new demands on merchants.  To balance the bud- 
get and finance unfinished projects, the reghlm imposed higher taxes 
on this class and reduced bank loans to shopkeepers  (Ettelaat, 1977: 
August 23, 29). Toward the end of 1977, the state further extended its 
control  by making shopkeepers '  licenses contingent on two new con- 
ditions: first, merchants '  guilds were  required to guarantee that licens- 
ees would not violate the law; and second, landlords who  rented space 
to shopkeepers  were  obliged to write a formal letter of  consent  to the 
government  on their behalf. These restrictions t roubled some shopkeep- 
ers, for the guilds were  unwilling to guarantee that licensees would  not  
violate the law. Furthermore, bazaaris who  disagreed with landlords over 
rents or other  matters were  automatically at a severe disadvantage (Et- 
telaat, 1977: December  3). 
Of all the state's policies affecting shopkeepers,  the most  damaging 
were price controls and the "antiprofiteering campaign." In August 1975, 
the government  rolled back prices of sixteen thousand items to their 
January 1974 levels. The profit  rate was set at 14 percent  even though 
inflation, according to the government ' s  own reports, was at least twice 
that level. Prices were  fixed at the retail market  level where  merchants  
and shopkeepers  operated, but  no controls were  imposed on factories 
that p roduced  and pr iced commodities,  nor  were  restrictions placed on 
the small number  of  large importers. Throughout  this uneven campaign, 
very few industrialists were  arrested for violating price restrictions. Those 
who  were  prosecuted  were  often outsiders, such as Elghanian, a Jewish 
industrialist, or Habib Sabet, a Baha'i. 
The impact  of  price controls on the bazaar was disastrous. In the 
first few days of the campaign, 7,750 shopkeepers  were  arrested (Kay- 
han International, 1975: August 8). By October  1977, approximately 
109,800 Tehran shopkeepers,  out of a total of 200,000, had been  in- 
vestigated for price control  violations (Ettelaat, 1977: October  27). Ac- 
cording to the Ministry of the Interior, 20,000 shopkeepers  had been  
jailed by the end of 1977. By autumn 1978, the nationwide total of  
shopkeepers  in violation of the controls was 220,000 (Ettelaat, 1978: 
September  26). The manner  in which the regime carried out its cam- 
paign was humiliating. When special courts found a shopkeeper  guilty, 
the shop was closed, a fine levied, and the shopkeeper  subjected to 
imprisonment  or  exile. A large banner  was hung from the doorway of 
the shop proclaiming that the store would  be closed temporari ly be- 
cause the owner  had been fined for profiteering. The courts also pub- 
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lished names and localities of arrested merchants  in national daily news- 
papers. 
Prior to the government ' s  antiprofiteering campaign and price 
control  policy, there had been divisions within the bazaar. Economic 
development  during the 1960s mad 1970s had diversified the bazaar, 
and a number  of  successful merchants  had left to deal in luxury goods. 
Because they benefited from state protect ion and limited licensing, they 
did not oppose the regime. Of those who  remained in the bazaar, a 
wealthy minority supported the government.  This was true even in the 
most  traditional sector  of' the bazaar, namely, rug dealers. Bazaari or- 
ganizations had also been  undermined. Though some merchants  and 
shopkeepers remained loyal to Mosaddegh's National Front, this orga- 
nization had become  practically nonexistent  due to repression. The 
Merchants '  Guild was controlled by the government  and never  gained 
the independence that the STBMSA had had. Religious bazaaris, too, were  
characterized by divergent political orientations. The upper echelon paid 
their religious taxes to Ayatollahs Shariat-Madari, Khonsari, and Khoie, 
while some middle- and lower-level shopkeepers  paid taxes to Ayatollah 
Khomeini. 7 These different religious leaders did not pursue the same 
political ends. Still other bazaaris backed the Freedom Movement,  a lib- 
eral religious organization led by Mehdi Bazargan, a supporter  of Mo- 
saddegh. Some less prosperous shopkeepers and artisans supported the 
Islamic Mojahedeen, an organization with socialist leanings. The vast 
majority of shopkeepers nationwide, however,  had become  nonpolitical 
after years of repression. 
These divisions indicate that no ideological consensus existed within 
the bazaar. The government ' s  antiprofiteering campaign and price con- 
trol policy, however, adversely affected most factions and impelled them 
to mobilize for collective action. Bazaaris already were  geographically 
concentrated in specific centers across the country  and possessed a na- 
tional trading network that facilitated communicat ion  and mobilization 
for collective action. But they lacked an overarching, autonomous or- 
ganization and a safe space to gather and organize their protests. Mosques 
and a segment of  the clergy provided these key elements. It is important  
to note, however,  that during this period, bazaaris began mobilizing in- 
dependently of  the mosque and long before the clergy. Initially, they" 
supported secular opposit ion groups against the government .  In Tehran, 
confrontation be tween  the bazaar and the state began in spring 1977, 
following several months  of antiprofiteering crackdowns and months  be- 
fore the massacre of clerical students in January 1978. Bazaaris began 
7 The leading supporters of  Khomeini in the bazaar included Khamoushi, Pour-Ostad, Amani, 
Shafiee, and Asgar-OladL 
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by supporting striking university professors who  were  protest ing the 
government ' s  decision to move  their campus from Tehran to Isfahan. In 
retaliation, the government  had cut faculty salaries. Bazaaris, along with 
university students, responded quickly by establishing funds to pay fac- 
ulty salaries in full. In July, bazaaris denounced  the Rastakhiz Party, the 
country 's  only political party, for "strangling" them through the price 
control  campaign. By the end of summer  1977, representatives from 
Tehran's bazaar had met  at least twice with officials of the Rastakhiz 
Party to express their dissatisfaction with the Chamber  of Guilds, the 
government's credit policy, and the new taxation scheme (Ettelaat, 1977: 
August 23 and 29). In October ,  Tehran bazaaris illegally reestablished 
the STBMSA, which had been outlawed since the coup d'dtat of 1953 
(Zamimeh-e Khabar Nameh, 16:31). 
On November  15, 1977, an overnight sit-in occurred  following a 
poetry- night at which  Saeed Soultanpour, a leftist poet,  spoke of repres- 
sion. The next  day as students from the sit-in took their demonstrat ion 
to the streets, nearby shopkeepers  joined in and shouted anti-Shah slo- 
gans. After one student was killed during the protest,  Tehran University 
students called for a national day of mourning on November  21. The 
Tehran bazaar responded by  shutting down completely" to support  the 
protest  (Zamimeh-e Khabar Nameh, 8 :12-13) .  The following day, three 
thousand bazaaris gathered in an orchard near Tehran to celebrate Aid- 
e Ghorban, a religious holiday, and invited leaders of the National Front. 
In reaction, the Savak dispatched 750 agents to break up the gathering, 
injuring many. This event  illustrated the difficulties of mobilizing, and 
thereafter bazaaris increasingly turned to the mosque  to organize their 
protests. In the following months bazaaris actively participated in the 
cycles of  mourning ceremonies  that began in Qom after the massacre 
of clerical students in January 1978. Bazaaris were able to finance mosque 
activities during these mourning ceremonies.  In fall 1978 when  Aya- 
tollah Khomeini  was expelled from Iraq, shopkeepers  in more  than a 
hundred cities went  on strike. Significantly, no comparable action had 
taken place fourteen years earlier when  Khomeini was initially exiled 
f rom his homeland. 
Bazaaris supported Ayatollah Khomeini  for several important  rea- 
sons. Khomeini was the only religious or political leader who  refused 
to compromise  with the Shah, calling for his overthrow. Khomeini con- 
sistently condemned  the Shah's dictatorial rule as well  as the moral  dec- 
adence and corrupt ion of the Pahlavi dynasty. Throughout  the revolu- 
tionary period, he promised  political f reedom to all social groups under  
an Islamic government.  Khomeini  also advocated social justice and 
maintained that an Islamic government  would serve the Mostazafin, 
meaning the oppressed and the abased. Finally, Khomeini attacked im- 
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perialist plundering of Iranian wealth. These statements were  widely 
supported within the bazaar because they reflected bazaaris' central 
concerns. 
Industrial Workers and White-Collar Professional Employees 
Following the 1953 coup d'6tat, strikes were  banned, and workers  
were  prevented  from forming independent  labor organizations. Hit hard 
by repression and rising inflation in the 1970s, workers  responded with 
only a few wildcat strikes prior  to the revolutionary period. Then the 
number  of walkouts increased, f rom a mere  handful be tween  1970 and 
1973 to more  than twenty in 1977 alone. During the f~st  three months  
of  1978, more  than ten new strikes were  called. In spring and summer  
1978, three strikes occurred,  mainly over  economic  issues. These strikes 
were  unrelated to each other  and lacked any coordination. 
In late August 1978, Shariff-Emani's administration announced re- 
forms that promised to liberalize the political system but  complete ly  
ignored workers '  economic  plight. As a consequence,  less than a week  
after the new administration took office, strikes broke out across the 
country. Thousands of workers  in auto, steel, oil, and railway went  on 
strike, to be joined by the vast majority of  workers  in other  sectors. 
Toward the end of September, white-collar employees joined the strikes. 
Like industrial workers,  they had been  repressed, lacked independent  
organizations, and were  adversely "affected by inflation. Government  pol- 
icies systematically favoring the bureaucratic bourgeoisie generated strife 
be tween lower and middle echelons of the bureaucracy and the state. 
By mid-October  the vast majority of industrial workers  and white-collar 
employees were  on strike. All this took place in little over  a month  in 
a country where  strikes were  illegal. 
An analysis of  strikers' demands during this period reveals that, 
with the except ion of a few groups such as teachers and students who  
demanded political freedom, the most  important  issues were  economic,  
with job-related problems close behind. All strikers demanded increases 
in wages and salaries, while most  also insisted on allowances or  loans 
for housing expenses and medical insurance. Many complained of in- 
equalities in wages and job classifications, especially where foreign workers 
were  employed. Some protes ted arbitrary p romot ion  rules and secret  
"rewards" by heads of bureaucracies. Strikers in oil, Isfahan Steel, a Cen- 
tral Alborz mine, a Zahedan railway, and Iran General Motors in Tehran 
pressed for the dismissal of corporate  directors or  heads of  government  
offices. Others such as postal employees complained their rights had 
been violated for years. 
To end the strikes, the government  agreed to some demands rel- 
atively quickly. As the scale of strikes increased, the regime decided to 
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deal with them on the national level and p roceed  with concessions, 
rather than repression. Thus the government  announced that within six 
months, in two stages, the salary of  government  employees  would be 
raised by 25 percent  (Ettelaat, 1978: October  10). Twenty  thousand 
government  employees  were  promised housing loans (Ettelaat, 1978: 
Oc tober  15). 
Workers '  response varied. While some re turned to work, others 
remained skeptical about  government  promises. Some strikers com- 
plained that although they had been  on strike for days, authorities had 
not even investigated their grievances. Most strikers regarded the 
concessions as insufficient because they demanded 50 to 100 percen t  
salary increases along with additional benefits (Tehran Journal, 1978: 
Oc tober  11). Concessions offered to industrial workers  we re  not as fa- 
vorable as those given white-collar workers.  The latter we re  promised  
housing loans, while industrial workers  were  to be  given low-rent hous- 
ing by their employers  who, in turn, were  subsidized through govern- 
ment  loans. This plan meant  that workers  would never  own their houses 
and would therefore be  even more  dependent  on their employers.  Be- 
cause of these inadequacies, major segments of  the work  force rejected 
the government ' s  offer. 
Toward the end of Shariff-Emami's administration, some strikers 
joined students and faculty in making political as well  as economic  de- 
mands. Employees of the Bank Melli of  Iran struck for a second time, 
claiming that the government  had not kept its promise  to increase sal- 
aries and ~so  demanding the release of all political prisoners and the 
dissolution of martial law. Striking oil workers  and employees  of  Iran 
Air, announcing their solidarity wi th  the popular  struggles, demanded  
unconditional release of  all political prisoners, dissolution of martial law, 
and expulsion of foreigners from their respective sectors. 
In response, the Shah suspended reforms and returned to a course 
of repression. On November  6, any possibility of compromise  was pre- 
c luded when  General Azhari was appointed to head a "law and order" 
militat T government.  Almost immediately, the army- tried to force em- 
ployees back to work  by occupying all strategic installations, including 
oil fields and refineries, radio and television stations, and newspaper  
offices. Universities and high schools were  closed down, and college 
campuses were  surrounded by the armed forces. Initially, the military 
administration brought  about  some degree of order. The second oil 
workers '  strike in the south was ended. Strikers in the Ministry of  Post 
and Telegraph, the State Tobacco  Monopoly, the Tabriz machine-tool 
factory, and Isfahan Steel were  forced to resume work. 
In the context  of popular  mobilization, the military could not re- 
press the opposit ion for long. With the imposition of the military gov- 
ernment,  bazaaris in major cities went  on strike and did not  reopen  their 
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shops for several months. Their action disrupted trade throughout the 
country. In addition, the earlier protests and strikes by workers and white- 
collar employees had created new solidarity structures that were  not 
easily dissolved. Employees in the banks of Melli and Markazi pulled 
down statues of the Shah and organized rallies at their workplaces. Pro- 
testing university professors and students organized antimilitary sit-ins 
to demand the reopening of colleges and universities, which had been 
closed by students themselves since the beginning of the school year. 
Industrial workers at the Tehran Oil Refinery, Arak Auto, and Tabriz 
Tractor continued their strikes despite military rule. They were  joined 
by the Tabriz lift-truck factory the day after the military assumed power. 
In late November, electrical workers regularly shut off electricity at 8:30 
P.M. tO prevent  the broadcast of government  news programs over radio 
and television. On December 2, oil workers in the south struck for the 
third time. Soon workers in the Bandar Abbas Steel Complex, Isfahan 
Steel, Kerman Copper and Coal mines, and on railways throughout  the 
country walked out (Kayhan, 1979: January 11, 15). By mid-January, the 
Chamber of Commerce stated that 3.5 million workers, including 1.5 
million industrial workers, were  out of work (Kayhan, 1979: January 20) 
and demanding political change. 
In this second round of strikes, political demands outweighed eco- 
nomic issues. In their calls for freedom, industrial workers and white- 
collar employees acknowledged Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership. On 
December  31, a central council composed of government  ministries and 
organizations from the private sector was organized to coordinate the 
strikes. The coordinating council issued a statement formally recogniz- 
ing Khomeini as leader of the people's "anti-imperialist, anti-autocratic" 
movement (Hambastegi, 8 9). The council rejected any compromise with 
Bakhtiar, the Shah's last prime minister, who, they claimed, represented 
"imperialism and dictatorship" (Hambastegi, 10). Within the coordinat- 
ing council, oil workers, led by militants, 35 percent  of whom were  
avowedly Marxist (Washington Post, 1979: February 26), played a crit- 
ical role by disrupting oil production, which cut government  revenues 
and intensified the economic crisis. 
C O N C L U S I O N  
This analysis demonstrates that models of social breakdown and 
social movement  do not adequately explain the collective actions of the 
Iranian revolution. Contrary to the claims of these models, neither up- 
rooted migrants, nor  the new middle class, nor the legitimate authority 
of the clergy and Shiite martyrdom were  the main agents generating the 
8 Hambastegi was a newsletter published at Tehran University during the fall of 1978. 
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conf l ic ts  o f  1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 9 ,  a l though  t hey  p l a y e d  s o m e  ro les  at d i f ferent  
points .  This  analysis focuses  ins tead  on  the  na tu re  of  the  state,  conf l ic ts  
o f  in teres t ,  c apac i ty  and  o p p o r t u n i t y  for  co l l ec t ive  act ion,  and  coa l i t i on  
format ion.  The  s tate  i n t e r v e n e d  in the  e c o n o m y ,  l imi t ing  the  o p e r a t i o n  
of  the  market .  A h igh  leve l  of  s ta te  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r e n d e r e d  the  govern-  
m e n t  vu lne rab le  to  cha l l enge  and  a t tack  in t imes  o f  cr is is  and  confl ict .  
The  s tate 's  d e v e l o p m e n t  po l i c i e s  adverse ly  af fec ted the  in te res t s  o f  ma- 
jor  social  classes: bazaaris,  indus t r ia l  workers ,  wh i t e - co l l a r  employees ,  
and  profess ionals .  The  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  an t ip ro f i t ee r ing  campa ign  gener -  
a t ed  an in t ense  conf l ic t  b e t w e e n  the  s ta te  and  the  bazaar.  Bazaari  mo-  
b i l iza t ion  p r o v i d e d  an o p p o r t u n i t y  for  o t h e r  groups ,  espec ia l ly  the  p ro-  
Khomeini  clergy, to oppose  the  regime. Governmen t  reforms in fall 1978 
p r o m i s e d  pol i t i ca l  f r e e d o m  and r e d u c t i o n  o f  repress ion ,  w h i c h  in tu rn  
p r o v i d e d  an o p p o r t u n i t y  for  indus t r ia l  w o r k e r s  and  wh i t e -co l l a r  em- 
p l o y e e s  to  s t r ike  and  d e m a n d  change.  These  g roups  f o r m e d  a coa l i t ion  
which,  under  the  leadership of  a faction of  the  clergy, eventual ly brought  
d o w n  the  monarchy .  
Desp i te  c la ims  by  some  obse rve r s  that  the  I ranian r evo lu t i on  was  
an  abe r r a t i on  f rom m o d e r n  revolu t ions ,  t he se  same  factors  and  s imilar  
sets  of  events  have  o p e r a t e d  to  gene ra t e  r evo lu t i ona ry  conf l ic ts  else- 
where .  The  Russian r evo lu t i on  of  1917 and the  Nicaraguan  r e v o l u t i o n  
o f  1979, for  example ,  d i sp lay  s ignif icant  s imi lar i t ies  w i th  the  I ranian ex-  
pe r i ence .  The  g o v e r n m e n t s  o f  b o t h  the  Tsar  and  Somoza  w e r e  h ighly  
in te rvent ion is t ,  w i t h  po l i c i e s  that  adverse ly  affected the  in te res t s  of  ma- 
jo r  socia l  classes. These  classes  f o r m e d  a t e m p o r a r y  coa l i t ion  du r ing  a 
p e r i o d  o f  cr is is  and  s u c c e e d e d  in br ingnag d o w n  the  gove rnmen t .  In  
t e rms  of  the  na tu re  of  the  state,  its d e v e l o p m e n t  pol ic ies ,  and  the  for- 
m a t i o n  of  coa l i t ions  a m o n g  adve r se ly  af fec ted classes,  the  I ranian  rev- 
o lut ion is not  atypical of  o the r  revolut ions  in con tempora ry  Third Wor ld  
countr ies .  
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